This was in the news from RFE/RL 28 January
2003
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Christian Berghänel
Sweden
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EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
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> RFE/RL
NEWSLINE Vol. 7, No. 17, Part II, 28 January 2003
>
>
> END
NOTE
>
> WHY ARE UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA UNABLE TO RESOLVE THEIR BORDER
DISPUTE?
>
> By Taras Kuzio
>
> On 29 January, the
first demarcation point on the
> Moldovan-Ukrainian is expected to be
installed in Chernivtsi Oblast
> (formerly North Bukovina). The
demarcation of the entire
> Moldovan-Ukrainian border is expected to take
another two years to
> complete. In June 1996, delimitation of the
1,200-kilometer border
> was based on the administrative border
established by the USSR on 4
> November 1940. This resolved 70-80 percent
of the delimitation. The
> remaining 20-30 percent took until 1999 to
complete.
> Why, then, the long delay in the border's demarcation?
The
> border dispute between Moldova-Ukraine has always involved more
than
> the issue of territory. The Moldovan village of Palanca is
located
> exactly on the country's border with Ukraine. The Odesa-Reni
highway
> runs through the village. When Moldova ceded a 7.7-kilometer
section
> of the highway to Ukraine, the village of Palanca was
effectively
> split in two. In exchange, Ukraine initially transferred to
Moldova
> 100 square kilometers of land, to be followed by another 1,000
square
> kilometers near the mouth of the Danube River. This has
allowed
> Moldova to begin building an oil terminal for the import
of
> Azerbaijani oil, thereby reducing its dependency on Russia for
energy
> and earning transit fees for the re-export of oil to other
countries.
> The agreement on the transfer of territory was signed
in
> August 1999 after delimitation was completed. But Ukraine refused
to
> withdraw its border troops from the Giurgiulesti region -- the
area
> seceded to Moldova to give it access to the Black Sea -- because
"an
> agreement on state borders has not yet been ratified." This, in
turn,
> halted the construction of the oil terminal.
> The ruling
Communist Party of Moldova (PCM) has always
> supported the territory
exchange. Opposition to it came from the
> Popular Party Christian
Democratic and other the center-right
> parties. Those parties pointed to
the constitution, which envisages
> making changes in the country's
territorial integrity only through a
> referendum. In September, the
Constitutional Court ruled in response
> to their objections that the
transfer of land was constitutional. A
> Foreign Ministry official pointed
out that the highway was not ceded
> but "transmitted into ownership" and
that this "does not harm the
> sovereignty of Moldova."
> An
additional factor that complicates the border dispute is
> the
Transdniester region. Since coming to power in 2001, the PCM has
> been a
staunch advocate of Moldova's territorial integrity, hoping
> that its
close relations with Russia would lead Moscow to apply
> pressure on the
Transdniester separatists to reach an agreement with
> Chisinau. But while
Russia first overtly and then covertly backed the
> Transdniester
separatists, it has been unable to force them to sit
> down at the
negotiating table.
> Although Russia has shifted its support to the
Moldovans
> since the election of the PCM, Ukraine still backs the
Transdniester
> separatists. Earlier this month, Ukraine's special
commissioner to
> the talks, Yevhen Levytsky, tabled a proposal that the
Transdniester
> be granted de facto independence "as a republic in its
current
> manifestations and characteristics" until a final settlement
is
> reached. The proposal envisaged that the Moldovans would desist
from
> interfering in the Transdniester while providing it with the
new
> customs seals to undertake external trade. Ukraine is also seeking
to
> open a consulate in the Transdniester.
> Moldovan President
Vladimir Voronin has become exasperated at
> the Transdniester stance and
especially that of its intransigent
> president, Igor Smirnov. Moldova
proposed installing joint
> Moldovan-Ukrainian customs checkpoints on its
-- and Transdniester's
> -- border with Ukraine.
> The OSCE has
backed that proposal. Joint checkpoints would,
> according to an OSCE
delegation that visited the border in December,
> make it possible "to
improve import- and export-control procedures
> from the Dniester region."
But this was precisely the issue that
> neither the Ukrainian or
Transdniester sides wanted to resolve, and
> hence they both rejected
joint checkpoints.
> In 1996, the Moldovans issued eight customs seals for
the
> Transdniester. By 2001, this number had been augmented by an
>
additional 348 forged customs seals. In September 2001, Moldova
> changed
its customs seals and thereby deprived the Transdniester of
> the
possibility of "legal" involvement in international trade. The
> Ukrainian
side has insisted that the new seals be given to the
> Transdniester. The
Moldovans have also demanded that countries refuse
> to issue visas to
residents of Transdniestr, many of whom have
> Russian
citizenship.
> Voronin has accused Ukrainian officials of involvement
in
> illegal smuggling rackets operating out of the Transdniester
and
> through the Ukrainian ports of Odesa and Illichevsk. In both of
these
> ports, the Transdniester has individuals capable of
fabricating
> documents facilitating such trade. Ukraine remains the only
CIS state
> that has not recognized the new Moldovan customs
seals.
> One measure of the extent of Transdniester officials'
>
involvement in the smuggling trade is the fact that Smirnov's son
> heads
the Transdniester State Customs Committee. The scale of the
> trade
Ukraine is facilitating for the Transdniester is evident in the
> 12,000
freight rail cars allowed to cross since the new customs seals
> were
introduced. Late last year, a tape recording made by former
> presidential
security officer Mykola Melnychenko of a conversation
> between Ukrainian
President Leonid Kuchma and Odesa Mayor Ruslan
> Bodelan was released
publicly. The tape substantiated allegations by
> Voronin and others of
Ukraine's long-standing involvement in
> Transdniester smuggling
rackets.
> These smuggling rackets allegedly involve weapons,
narcotics,
> metals, oil, gas, cigarettes, and other commodities. As
Voronin
> complained: "We in Moldova have understood that Smirnov is a
bandit.
> It is not clear who he is for Ukraine." The Transdniester was
the
> most industrialized region of Moldova, with many factories
involved
> in military production. Since 1992, the region has been forced
to
> create closed production cycles for many of these weapons, such
as
> small arms, mortars, GRAD multiple-missile and grenade
launchers.
> The Transdniester's involvement in the export of such
weapons
> -- some of which could fall into terrorists' hands -- was one
reason
> why the issue was on the agenda during Voronin's December visit
to
> the United States, where he met with President George W. Bush.
U.S.
> awareness of Ukraine's involvement in the smuggling rackets might,
in
> turn, contribute to worsening the already poor relations between
Kyiv
> and Washington.
>
> Dr. Taras Kuzio is a resident
fellow at the Centre for Russian and
> East European Studies, University
of Toronto.
>
>
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