Subject: re growing stalemate on horn advances breakaway tripoint prospects
Date: Aug 27, 2006 @ 21:58
Author: aletheia kallos (aletheia kallos <aletheiak@...>)
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my apologies for unwittingly sending this subsequently
restricted link
http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=273644&selected=Analyses
which was nonrestricted both when i originally sent it
& again now as i lift the following text from it

Somalia: Islamists at a Crossroads
August 25, 2006 20 00 GMT

Summary

The events of Aug. 23-25 indicate that the Islamic
Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia realizes it is at a
crossroads. The ICU has two choices: consolidate and
strengthen its position in southern and central
Somalia or bolster its forces for an attack against
the interim government and Ethiopian troops in Baidoa.

Analysis

Somalia's Islamic Courts Union (ICU) issued a threat
to Ethiopia on Aug. 25: Withdraw troops from Somalia
or face an all-out war. A day earlier, the ICU
reopened the port of Mogadishu, which had been closed
for 10 years. That came one day after reports
indicated the ICU is operating a militia training camp
outside Jowhar, north of Mogadishu, and that foreign
trainers have been seen at the camp.

The ICU has reached the limits of its attempt to take
control of Somalia. The interim government remains in
place in Baidoa, surrounded by Ethiopian troops, but
has little influence; the ICU does not appear
confident that it has sufficient forces to oust the
Ethiopian troops and thus claim Baidoa. The Islamists
are now faced with two options: consolidate their hold
on the territory they already have or prepare for a
larger offensive against the Ethiopian-backed interim
government in Baidoa.

The ICU threat against Ethiopia does not yet appear to
be backed by any concrete capability on the ICU's
part. Ethiopia intervened in the ICU offensives in
Somalia because of its own national security concerns,
but Ethiopia does not intend to go much further than
the seat of Somalia's interim government. In effect,
there is a stalemate on the battlefield and neither
side is prepared to go on the offensive.

The ICU is working to change this. By opening the port
of Mogadishu, the group can regain the support of the
business leaders who helped the ICU move into the city
in the first place. The move also allows relief goods,
food and other products to be imported, which will
strengthen the ICU's position with the Somali people.
Not coincidentally, it also creates a new path for the
ICU to import weapons and new foreign recruits if it
chooses.

This backs up reports by observers that the ICU
training camp is now staffed by foreign trainers,
particularly South Asians. The international (and
particularly the U.S.) concern with the ICU revolves
around the fear that, should the ICU come to power,
Somalia could become another Afghanistan -- a
training, planning and coordination safe-haven for
international Islamist forces. Reports of Pakistani,
Eritrean and Afghan trainers at the ICU camp compound
this concern.

For the ICU, contact with foreign fighters probably
has less to do with allowing Somalia to become a new
breeding ground for international militants and more
to do with training new recruits for its own forces,
and perhaps recruiting some foreign fighters to assist
in a future assault against the Ethiopian forces in
Baidoa. Furthermore, there are still debates among the
ICU leadership about the depth of Islamism the
organization wants to bring to Somalia; some leaders
could be arguing for links to the broader
international Islamist movements.

Whatever the reason behind it, the alleged presence of
foreign fighters at the ICU's training camp is drawing
U.S. attention, though there is no consensus on the
acuteness of the threat or whether any action other
than diplomacy is necessary. From the ICU's
perspective, creating the impression of a potentially
troubling situation could be an attempt to coerce
Washington into dealing with the group rather than
ignoring it, and to get Somalia's interim government
to negotiate.

The ICU has already shown willingness to negotiate
with its opponents and even strike deals with
competing warlords, and the interim government is also
viewed as open to talks. But with Ethiopian troops
present, the interim government seems unlikely to come
to the table.

Should the Islamists hold and consolidate their
positions in southern and central Somalia, the ICU
faces the threat that its hold elsewhere will become
untenable. However, the Islamists are not yet strong
enough to take on the Ethiopian forces protecting the
interim government; thus, the ICU is recruiting
additional fighters. The question now is whether the
ICU will go beyond foreign trainers and allow or
encourage foreign recruits. If the ICU's training camp
appears to be used by international Islamists, such as
al Qaeda and its affiliates, Washington could get
involved and break the Somali impasse.


however or moreover
the general triarea that was identified a few days ago

where the part of somalia under islamist control meets
the part under puntland control & alliance along the
ethiopian border
is still looking highly volatile all the way south to
the shabelle valley
http://www.garoweonline.com/stories/publish/article_4734.shtml

maps & other data in original message
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/BoundaryPoint/message/19809

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